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Recent Decisions

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SIXTH AMENDMENT-DEFENDANT'S
CONFRONTATION-IMPEACHMENT

To

SHOW

BIAs-The

RIGHT OF

Supreme

Court of Pennsylvania held that even if the lower court denies defendants their confrontation right to reveal bias by exposing a witness' pending conviction, the decision will not be reversed if the
error was harmless.
Commonwealth v. Lane, 621 A.2d 566 (Pa. 1993).
In October 1984, Bernard Lane ("Lane") was convicted of second degree murder, robbery and possession of an instrument of
crime in connection with a murder.' At trial, prosecution witness
George Thomas ("Thomas") testified that Lane had confessed to
the murder.2 At the time of his testimony, charges of robbery,
theft, kidnapping and attempted rape were pending against
Thomas.3
On cross examination, Lane's counsel attempted to impeach
Thomas by uncovering that Thomas possessed a possible motive
which could have induced him to testify falsely against Lane.4
Through the examination of Thomas with respect to these charges,
Lane's counsel attempted to demonstrate that Thomas hoped to
1. Commonwealth v. Lane, 621 A.2d 566 (Pa. 1993). Lane was convicted of the murder of Wesley Mahoney in Philadelphia on February 19, 1983. Lane, 621 A.2d at 566.
2. Id. The trial transcript revealed that following the murder, George Thomas met
Lane in the C & B lounge where Lane stated that he "just busted a guy". Brief for Appellant at 5, Lane (no. 168) [hereinafter Appellant's Brief]. The transcript also revealed that
Thomas interpreted this as an indication that Lane had shot a person. Appellant's Brief at
5. Further, Thomas also testified that he had seen appellant with a forty-five automatic
weapon on that same night. Appellant's Brief at 5-6.
3. Lane, 621 A.2d at 567.
4. Id.
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gain favorable treatment in the sentencing of the separate prosecutions which he had received.5
The trial court permitted Lane's attorney to question Thomas as
to the charges of robbery and theft, but not to the more serious
charges of kidnapping and attempted rape.' Instead, the trial court
limited reference to these latter crimes as "other felonies of a serious nature."'7 The trial court reasoned that these latter crimes were
not crimen falsi offenses. 8 Lane appealed to the Superior Court of
Pennsylvania. 9 The superior court affirmed the lower court decision, finding that the distinction made by the trial court between
the seriousness of the charges was erroneous, but that the error
was harmless.' °
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the superior court's decision and addressed the issue of whether Lane's
confrontation rights were violated by the trial court's decision to
limit cross-examination during the impeachment of Thomas." Further, the court addressed whether the resulting error was
harmless. 2
The supreme court agreed with the superior court that the trial
court had erred by distinguishing between crimen falsi charges and
other charges.'" Specifically, the supreme court recognized that impeachment of a witness could be accomplished through prior crimen falsi convictions or through a showing of bias based on pending criminal charges in the same jurisdiction.1 4 The court noted
that in the present case, impeachment was based on bias due to
pending charges against Thomas. 15 Thus, the court determined
5. Id. The trial transcript revealed that Thomas had made an agreement with the
prosecutor regarding his pending charges and a bargain had been struck with regard to bail.
Appellant's Brief at 6. If Thomas was convicted, his testimony against Lane would be made
known to the sentencing judge. Appellant's Brief at 6.
6. Lane, 621 A.2d at 567.
7. Id.
8. Id. "Crimen falsi" refers to crimes involving dishonesty, deceitfulness and untruthfulness which reflect the witness' tendency to testify truthfully. BLACK'S LAW DICTIoNARY 372 (6th ed. 1990).
9. Commonwealth v. Lane, 596 A.2d 252 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991), aff'd, 621 A.2d 566
(Pa. 1993).
10. Lane, 621 A.2d at 567.
11. Id. at 568.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Lane, 621 A.2d at 568.
15. Id. See also FED. R. EVID. 609. The 1990 amendment to Rule 609(a) applied to
the balancing test of Rule 403 to protect against unjust impeachment of a witness. The
advisory committee noted:
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that it was not the nature of the offense, but rather the harshness
of the penalties accompanying the conviction of those pending
charges which produced the possible basis for the witness' bias and
motive to aid the prosecution.'
Furthermore, the supreme court held that the Pennsylvania
Constitution guaranteed criminal defendants the right to confront
a witness in order to reveal bias.1 7 The supreme court affirmed the
superior court decision and asserted that if the possibility of bias
existed as a result of outstanding criminal charges, then this possibility must be revealed to the jury.'$ Further, the court held that
the right of confrontation included the right of a defendant to
cross-examine a prosecution witness when the circumstances
presented any possibility that the witness was biased."
The balancing test protects civil litigants, the government in criminal cases, and the
defendant in a criminal case who calls other witnesses. The amendment addresses
prior convictions offered under Rule 609, not for other purposes, and does not run
afoul, therefore, of Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974). . . . The defendant in a
criminal case has the right to demonstrate the bias of a witness and to be assured a
fair trial, but not to unduly prejudice a trier of fact. See generally Rule 412. In any
case in which the trial court believes that confrontation rights require admission of
impeachment evidence, obviously the Constitution would take precedence over the
rule.
FED. R. EVID. 609 Senate Advisory Committee's note.
The court in Davis held that the confrontation clause of the U.S. Constitution guaranteed a
defendant the right to be confronted with an adverse witness in state and criminal proceedings. Davis, 415 U.S. at 308. See notes 92-100 and accompanying text.
16. Lane, 621 A.2d at 567.
17. Id. Article I, § 9, of the Pennsylvania Constitution, in relevant part provides: "In
all criminal prosecutions the accused hath the right to be heard by himself and his counsel,
to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to meet the witness face to
face .. " PA. CONST. art. I, § 9.
18. Lane, 621. A.2d at 567. The supreme court relied on its decision in Evans in affirming the superior court decision. Commonwealth v. Evans, 512 A.2d 626 (Pa. 1986). See
notes 63-70 and accompanying text. In Evans, the court held that the lower court erred in
not allowing the defendant to question the state's key witness regarding charges pending
against him and not only his role in the crime in question. Evans, 512 A.2d at 626. Further,
the court held this error was not harmless. Id.
19. Lane, 621 A.2d at 567. The court relied on its earlier decision in Commonwealth
v. Butler, 601 A.2d 268 (Pa. 1991), in which a pending civil action created the possibility of
bias. Butler, 601 A.2d at 268. See notes 71-82 and accompanying text. In Butler, the court
held that the defendant should have been permitted to cross-examine a detective who was a
defendant in a civil suit brought by the defendant. Id. See also Commonwealth v. Sullivan,
402 A.2d 1019 (Pa. 1979). See notes 55-60 and accompanying text. In Sullivan, a police
officer attempted to arrest the defendant's son. Sullivan, 402 A.2d at 1019. The defendant
faced prosecution for hindering apprehension and for simlile assault. Id. The court held that
the trial court erred by refusing to allow the defendant to cross examine the arresting police
officer regarding his suspension from the police force, resulting from the incident. Id. The
court held that the defendant should have been permitted to question the police officer to
show any interest and resulting bias the police officer had in the outcome of the case. Id.
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Nonetheless, the supreme court affirmed the trial court's determination that the jury had been informed adequately and was able
to assess the bias and credibility of Thomas in regard to his testimony.20 In essence, the court agreed with the superior court that
the error was harmless. 2 The court held that it was within the discretion of the trial judge to limit the scope of cross-examination.22
Moreover, the court opined that the trial judge was best able to
determine the proper scope of cross-examination. 23 The court declared that the function of the trial judge was to balance the probative value of introducing pending criminal charges against a witness versus the prejudicial effect of revealing such charges. 2' The
court concluded that the trial judge acted within the sound discretion of the court.25 Hence, although the limiting instruction was
erroneous, Lane had not been prejudiced in his defense.26
Justice Larsen, in a concurring opinion, disagreed with the majority and proposed that the harmless error doctrine was not applicable to this case, as it only applied to judicial rulings.2 7 Accordingly, Justice Larsen held that no error was committed by the trial
court.28

Justice Nix, in a dissent, agreed with the majority opinion insofar as it found that the trial court committed an error when it limited defendant's right to question Thomas regarding pending
charges of attempted rape and kidnapping.29 However, Justice Nix
disagreed that the error was harmless.30 Instead, Justice Nix con20. Lane, 621 A.2d at 568. During the trial, Lane referred voluntarily to the crime of
kidnapping. Id. The trial transcript revealed that in its charge, the jury was instructed to
consider the agreement the Commonwealth had made with Thomas in determining if there
existed bias on the part of the witness. Brief for Appellee at 8, Lane (No. 168) [Appellee's
Brief].
21. Lane, 621 A.2d at 568.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. The court based this aspect of its decision on its prior decision in Commonwealth v. Beasley, 475 A.2d 730 (Pa. 1984). The Beasley case involved a prosecutor's comments which allegedly discredited the veracity of the only fact witnesses. Beasley, 475 A.2d
at 730. The court found that it was within the discretion of the trial court to determine the
extent of leading questions. Id. Further, only an abuse of the trial court's discretion in allowing the prosecutor's style of questions would result in a reversal. Id.
25. Lane, 621 A.2d at 568.
26. Id. at 568.
27. Id. (Larsen, J., concurring). The harmless error doctrine permits at trial the occurrence of errors, which do not prejudice the defendant's case, without the necessity of

reversal by an appellate court.
28.
29.
30.

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY

Lane, 621 A.2d at 569 (Larsen, J. concurring).
Id. (Nix, J., dissenting).
Id.

718 (6th ed. 1990).
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tended that the majority should have followed precedent and determined that if there existed a possibility that a prosecution witness may be biased, that bias must be revealed to the jury.'
Therefore, once the trial judge limited defense counsel from questioning Thomas regarding the kidnapping and attempted rape
charges, Lane was prejudiced in his defense. 2
In analyzing cases dealing with a criminal defendant's right to
cross-examine an adverse witness, the Pennsylvania courts have
used three district approaches. First, the courts have examined the
area of impeachment for the purpose of revealing bias. Second, the
courts have looked to a criminal defendant's right to cross-examine
an adverse witness and have focused on the confrontation clause of
the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 3 Third,
the courts have considered the defendant's rights pursuant to article, 1 section 9, of the Pennsylvania Constitution. 4 Similarly, a
historical analysis of impeachment is best illustrated by following
this three-part analytical framework.
In 1908, the Pennsylvania courts first addressed the issue of impeachment of a witness in order to show bias. In Lenahan v. Pittston Coal Mining Co.,3 5 the defendant called his attorney to testify
for the purpose of discrediting a plaintiff's witness.3 6 The attorney
also represented the surety company that had insured the defendant.3 7 The court in Lenahan addressed the issue of whether the
trial court erred in allowing opposing counsel to question the attorney to demonstrate that he also represented the surety, so as to
show possible bias. 8 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held
that a party against whom a witness is called always has the right
to show by cross-examination that he had an interest direct or collateral in the result of the trial, or that he had a relation to the
39
party from which bias would naturally arise.
31. Id. This bias could be the result of either outstanding criminal charges or any
non-final criminal disposition against the witness. Id. Justice Nix relied on the court's decision in Commonwealth v. Evans for this proposition. Evans, 512 A.2d at 626. See also note
19 and accompanying text.
32. Lane, 621 A.2d at 569 (Nix, J., dissenting). Accordingly, Justice Nix concluded
that he would have reversed the order of the superior court and granted the defendant a
new trial. Id.
33. U.S. CONST. amend. VI., cl. 1.
34. PA. CONST. art. I, § 9.
35. 70 A. 884 (Pa. 1908).
36. Lenahan, 70 A. at 884.
37. Id. at 885.
38. Id.
39. Id.
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Sixty-five years later, in Commonwealth v. Coades,"° the court
addressed the related issue of whether a witness can be questioned
regarding an indictment resulting from the same crime for which
he is testifying.4 1 In Coades, a witness for the prosecution testified
against a co-defendant, when both had been charged with burglary,
robbery, larceny, and conspiracy. 2 The witness had pleaded guilty
to conspiracy and received a sentence of three months probation. 3
On appeal, the supreme court reversed the trial court decision,
and held that the court had committed error when it did not permit the co-defendant to cross-examine the witness on the charges
which had been n6lle prossed." The court further explained that a
jury should be given the opportunity to evaluate whether the witness testified in order to gain favorable treatment in his own case.4 5
The supreme court held that a witness, indicted for the same crime
as that of the case in which he was testifying, was permitted to be
cross-examined about that indictment."'
Subsequently, in Commonwealth v. Joines,7 the superior court
broadened the Coades rule48 to permit cross-examination of a witness to reveal bias relating to any crime committed by the witness
within the jurisdiction. 9 In Joines, the appellant attempted to
question a prosecution witness regarding his outstanding indictment and guilty plea in an unrelated case.5 0 The trial court refused
to permit cross-examination of the witness, and found appellant
guilty of the charges.' On appeal, the superior court noted an ex40. 311 A.2d 896 (Pa. 1973).
41. Coades, 311 A.2d at 897-98.
42. Id. at 897.
43. Id.
44. Id. "Nolle Prosse" refers to an entry upon the record made by a plaintiff in a civil
suit, or by the prosecuting attorney in a criminal suit in which the party states he "'will no
further prosecute'." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1048 (6th ed. 1990).
45. Coades, 311 A.2d at 897.
46. Id. The court reasoned that if the co-defendant had been permitted to pursue
this questioning, it might have revealed that the witness was biased because of the favorable
treatment he received from the prosecution. Id.
47. 399 A.2d 776 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979).
48. See notes 40-46 and accompanying text.
49. Joines, 399 A.2d at 778. The court in Joines stated that "'It]he rationale for
permitting this type of cross-examination is that the jury should be allowed to evaluate
whether the witness testified for the prosection to gain favorable treatment in his own
case.'" Id. (quoting Coades, 311 A.2d at 898).
The court did not distinguish Coades, but instead held that both requirements necessary
for the exception in Coades were met-there was an outstanding indictment; and the prosecution had actually promised leniency. Joines, 399 A.2d at 779.
50. Id. at 778.
51. Id.
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ception to the general rule that a witness cannot be impeached by
past criminal conduct unless convicted of the crime. 2 Hence, the
superior court reversed the lower court and held the error could
not be deemed harmless.5 3 In interpreting the Coades rule, the
court noted two requirements: (1) the existence of an indictment
against the witness, and (2) evidence that the prosecution could
5
promise leniency. 1
In addition to cross-examination as to a witness' criminal history, Pennsylvania courts have consistently determined that a
criminal defendant could cross-examine an adverse witness by impeaching him with evidence demonstrating possible bias resulting
from his interest in the outcome of the trial. For instance, in Commonwealth v. Sullivan,55 the defendant was prosecuted and found
guilty of hindering apprehension and simple assault after he had a
confrontation with a police officer during the arrest of his son.5 6
The police officer was suspended following the incident out of
which the prosecution arose. At the defendant's trial, the court
denied the defendant the right to question the police officer regarding his suspension." The supreme court reversed and granted
the defendant a new trial, reasoning that the possible bias of a witness is always relevant and can be uncovered at trial to discredit
the witness.5 9 Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in
Sullivan held that a defendant could not be denied his confrontation right to examine a witness as to any motives he may have had
in testifying.8 0
Relying on Coades 11 and Joines, 2 the supreme court, in Commonwealth v. Evans, 3 addressed the issue of whether restricting
52. Id.
53. Id. at 779.
54. Joines, 399 A.2d at 778.
55. 402 A.2d 1019 (Pa. 1979).
56. Sullivan, 402 A.2d at 1019-20.
57. Id. at 1020.
58. Id.
59. Id. Specifically, the court stated:
A more particular attack on the witness' credibility is effected by means of crossexamination directed toward revealing possible biases, prejudices, or ulterior motives
of the witness as they may relate directly to issues or personalities in the case at
hand. The partiality of a witness is subject to exploration at trial, and is "always
relevant as discrediting the witness and affecting the weight of his testimony."
Id. at 1020 (quoting Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1973)).
60. Sullivan, 402 A.2d at 1020.
61. See notes 40-46 and accompanying text.
62. See notes 47-54 and accompanying text.
63. 512 A.2d 626 (Pa. 1986).
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the examination of a witness regarding pending charges against
him was a violation of constitutionally guaranteed rights of the defendant."' For the first time, the supreme court was willing to
enunciate a rule which had previously been too speculative: even
when no promise of leniency has been made, a prosecution witness
may be biased upon an expectation of leniency. s In Evans, the
defendant was charged and convicted of second degree murder,
criminal conspiracy and robbery. 6 At trial, the court restricted the
defendant's examination of an informant who was the main witness for the prosecution. 7 On appeal, the supreme court reversed
the lower court decision, holding that the defendant should have
been allowed to cross-examine the informant regarding the charges
pending against the informant in another crime. 8 Thus, even if the
prosecution had not made any agreements, or any promise of an
agreement, the possibility existed that the witness may have hoped
for favorable treatment if he testified in favor of the prosecution. 9
Hence, the court in Evans asserted that if the possibility exists
that a witness may be biased and will testify in favor of the prosecution as a result of pending charges against that witness, this bias
must be revealed to the jury. 70 Therefore, the court recognized the
significance of revealing bias.
Later, in Commonwealth v. Butler,71 an adverse witness in the
defendant's case was also a defendant in a civil suit brought by the
defendant. 72 The issue presented was whether a witness can be
64. Evans, 512 A.2d at 632.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 628.
67. Id. Although the court did allow the appellants to question the witness/informant
with regard to his motive in testifying in the defendant's case, they were restricted from
examining the witness in regard to whether he expected leniency in the other criminal
charges pending against him. Id.
68. Evans, 512 A.2d at 628. The court considered the number and seriousness of
pending charges against the witness in determining that an error had occurred. Id. at 629.
69. Id. at 631.
70. Id. The court in Evans stated specifically, "whenever a prosecution witness may
be biased in favor of the prosecution because of outstanding criminal charges or because of
any non-final criminal disposition against him in the same jurisdiction, that possible bias,
within fairness must be made known to the jury." Id.
The court also noted that the jury must determine whether it believes the witness after
the testimony. Further, the court stated that the court should not determine if cross-examination would affect the jury's decision, because cross-examination is a right guaranteed by
the Confrontation Clause of the United States Constitution as well as the Pennsylvania
Constitution. Id. at 632.
71. 601 A.2d 268 (Pa. 1991).
72. Butler, 601 A.2d 269.
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questioned regarding his involvement in a pending civil suit."3 The
defendant in Butler was originally charged with prostitution and
acquitted." At trial, the defendant had testified that she had never
been convicted of a crime. 5 Subsequent to her acquittal, the defendant filed a civil suit based on a coercive body cavity search. 76
Following the institution of her civil suit, it was discovered that
the defendant did have a prior conviction." At the subsequent
trial where the defendant faced charges of perjury and false swearing, evidence regarding the civil suit was not permitted to be
presented to the jury.7' The defendant was convicted and sentenced to twenty-three months imprisonment. 79 On appeal, the superior court reversed, holding that the witness' personal liability to
the defendant was a basis from which the jury could have inferred
bias on the part of the witness. 80 The supreme court, in affirming
the superior court, held that the defendant should have been permitted to question the witness regarding'the civil suit.8 1 The supreme court reaffirmed that a criminal defendant possessed the
right to question an adverse witness with evidence demonstrating
that the witness had an interest in the outcome of the trial due to
82
a related civil suit.
Recently, in Commonwealth v. Birch, 3 the supreme court expanded the rule regarding impeachment in relation to civil suits.8 4
In Birch, the witness broke the window of, and attempted to steal,
73. Id. at 268.
74. Id.
75. Id. The defendant later testified at trial that although she had been convicted
previously, she honestly believed that since an appeal had been taken, it was not final. Id.
76. Butler, 601 A.2d at 269. The defendant claimed to have been forced to submit to
a body cavity search and that the police had threatened to transport her to a hospital where
she would be shackled for a gynecological exam. Id.
77. Id. The authorities had discovered that the defendant had been convicted for
prostitution and was in violation of her probation. Id.
78. Id. The defendant contended that the perjury charges were the result of
prosecutorial vindictiveness. Id.
79. Id. at 270.

80. Id.
81. Butler, 601 A.2d at 270. Specifically the court stated:
Detective O'Leary was a defendant in a civil suit instituted by [the defendant],
against whom he testified, and therefore, could be personally liable to [the defendant]. This would provide a legitimate basis for a jury to infer bias on the part of
Detective O'Leary, particularly where the outcome of the trial would materially affect
the probability of success of the civil action.
Id. at 271.
82. Id.
83. 616 A.2d 977 (Pa. 1992).
84. Birch, 616 A.2d at 978.
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appellant's car."5 As a result, the appellant was charged with aggravated assault and reckless endangerment when he shot and injured
the witness.8 6
Prior to the trial, the witness had acquired counsel to initiate a
civil action for his injuries, but he had not yet filed suit.87 At trial,
the defense was not permitted to question the witness regarding
the possible civil suit as a source of bias. " On appeal, the supreme
court granted the appellant a new trial, holding that, in light of
these possible motives, the witness should have been examined for
the purpose of revealing any bias due tothe possible civil claim.89
The court reasoned that even in a situation in which no civil action
had yet been filed, a witness may be motivated to testify falsely.90
Thus, the court concluded that even when a civil suit had not yet
been filed, the jury should have been informed of any possible witness bias due to the possibility of a subsequent civil suit.9 1
The courts have also analyzed impeachment as an implication of
the Confrontation Clause of the U.S. Constitution. For example, in
Davis v. Alaska,9 2 an Alaska trial court issued a protective order
prohibiting the questioning of a key witness.' 3 The order was an
attempt to protect the anonymity of the juvenile witness." The
Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the lower court. 5
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court held that the Confrontation Clause of the U.S. Constitution guarantees an accused
85. Id. at 977-78.
86. Id. The incident occurred as appellant noticed two men by his car and saw a
shiny metallic object in one of the men's hands. Id. Appellant claimed he feared this was a
weapon and reacted by firing his gun and wounding the witness in the hip. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Birch, 616 A.2d at 974.
90. Id. at 979. The court noted that a witness may be biased based on a belief that if
the defendant was convicted, evidence of this conviction could be beneficial to the witness in
a subsequent civil suit. Id.
91. Id.
92. 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
93. Davis, 415 U.S. at 310-11.
94. Id. at 314. The trial court relied on Alaska Rule of Children's Procedure 23 which
provided: "No adjudication, order, or disposition of a juvenile case shall be admissible in a
court in acting in the exercise of juvenile jurisdiction except for use in a presentencing procedure in a criminal case where the superior court, in its discretion, determines that such

use is appropriate."

ALASKA

R.

CHILDREN'S

P. 23.

The trial court also relied on an Alaska statute which provided: "[tihe commitment and
placement of a child and evidence given in the court are not admissible as evidence against
the minor in a subsequent case or proceedings in any other court.
ALASKA STAT.
§ 4 7 .10.080(g) (1990).
95. Davis, 415 U.S. at 314.

1994

Recent Decisions

339

the right to be confronted with an adverse witness in state and
federal criminal proceedings."6 The United States Supreme Court
based its conclusion on two factors: (1) the defense had the right to
show that a witness was biased due to probationary status and possible charges which might be filed against him, and (2) a petitioner's right of confrontation superseded a state's policy in protecting the confidentiality of juvenile offenders. 7 On this basis, the
Court rejected the state court's conclusion that the accused had
been permitted to sufficiently question the witness on the issue of
bias. 8
The Court recognized that one of the functions included in the
constitutionally protected right of cross-examination is a defendant's ability to uncover the partiality of a witness' testimony. 9 Accordingly, the United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that
petitioner was denied his right of confrontation.1 00
Although the Pennsylvania courts had applied Davis in several
instances, in Commonwealth v. Mines,10 1 the Superior Court of
Pennsylvania maintained that the application of Davis did not automatically confer upon a defendant a constitutional right to crossexamine a witness to show bias.1 02 In Mines, a key witness had
10 3
identified the defendant as one of two men who had robbed him.
The defendant attempted to question the witness regarding his juvenile record in order to reveal a motive for falsely testifying.'
Essentially, the defendant wanted to show that the witness may
have lost his valuables while gambling and was giving false testimony so as to not reveal this to his parents. 1°
96. Id. at 315. See also Thaddeus R. Lightfoot, Sixth Amendment Issues at Trial, 75
GEo. L.J. 1108 (1987) (discussing what guarantees the Sixth Amendment affords a defendant at trial).
97. Davis, 415 U.S. at 317-19.
98. Id. at 318. The court quoted Professor Wigmore's treatise on evidence:
The main and essential purpose of confrontation is to. secure for the opponent the
opportunity of cross-examination. The opponent demands confrontation not for the
idle purpose of gazing upon the witness, or of being gazed upon by him, but for the
purpose of cross-examination, which cannot be had except by the direct and personal
putting of questions and obtaining immediate answers.
Id. at 315-16 (citation omitted).
99. Id. at 316.
100. Id. at 320-21.
101. 468 A.2d 1115 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983).
102. Mines, 468 A.2d at 1116.
103. Id. At trial, the witness testified as having had his watch and a few dollars taken.

Id.
104. Id. at 1116.
105. Id. at 1117. Further, the defendant hoped to show that the witness' parents had
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The superior court affirmed the lower court decision, finding the
10 6
defendant's theory of possible witness bias too speculative.
Thus, the court in Mines determined that if a defendant's theory
is too speculative, or is related only partially to the facts in issue,
cross-examination to show bias may be
denied without infringing
1 07
on a defendant's constitutional rights.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, however, overruled Mines
in Commonwealth v. Simmons. 0 8 In Simmons, the defendant became involved in a confrontation resulting in the stabbing of the
witness." 9 At the trial, the defendant attempted to introduce the
witness' juvenile record to reveal any possible bias.11 0 The superior
court had relied on Mines and denied the defendant's counsel the
opportunity to cross-examine the witness to adequately develop
the issue of bias.'
The supreme court reversed the superior court's decision, holding that the appellee was denied her Sixth Amendment right of
confrontation of cross-examination.1 2 The court found error with
its previous decision in Mines, stating that the court cannot speculate as to the jury reaction to this theory of bias due to a witness'
recently filed incorrigibility petitions against the witness, and the witness feared that if they
discovered his gambling activities, they would turn him into the police and the probation
officer, thereby resulting in the suspension of his probation. Id.
106. Id.
107. Mines, 468 A.2d at 1117. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Evans, although
not addressing the claim of a Sixth Amendment violation, noted:
In a recent case before that Court, Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 473 U.S. 923 (1986), the
United States Supreme Court held that a defendant in a criminal case was denied his
Sixth Amendment right of confrontation when he was denied opportunity to crossexamine one of sixteen prosecution witnesses as to whether, prior to his testimony in
this case, an unrelated criminal charge of drunkenness on a highway had been dismissed after the witness agreed to speak with the prosecutor.
Evans, 512 A.2d at 632.
108. 555 A.2d 860 (Pa. 1989).
109. Simmons, 555 A.2d at 861. The confrontation was the result of a longstanding
feud between the neighbors, their families and a male acquaintance, whom the witness believed to be the father of her daughter. Id. The defendant was subsequently arrested and
charged with aggravated assault, recklessly endangering another person, and possession of
an instrument of crime. Id.
110. Id. at 862. The defendant attempted to reveal the witness' juvenile record and
probationary status to reveal that her vulnerable status as a probationer could serve as a
possible motive for testifying falsely and with bias. Id.
111. Id. The superior court based its conclusion on the examination of the trial transcript, from which the court determined that the transcript did not support any inference
that the incident would have jeopardized the witness' probationary status. Id.
112. Id. Specifically, the court stated that "[w]e now disavow Commonwealth v. Mines
and herein hold that a prosecution witness' juvenile probationary status is relevant to show
bias regardless of whether the person appears as the victim/complainant." Id. at 863.
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status as a probationer if it had been permitted."' Further, the
court concluded that the jurors were entitled to have the theory
presented to them to allow them to make an informed
4
judgement."
Finally, in Commonwealth v. Borders,"5 the appellant attempted to establish bias through the introduction of pending juvenile criminal charges which were filed subsequently to the juvenile's arrest for a stabbing." 6 The trial court did not permit the
introduction of the record, holding that introduction of this information would have served only to smear the character of the witness." 7 The superior court affirmed and on an appeal was reversed
by the supreme court."'
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reaffirmed the law in Pennsylvania with regard to a criminal defendant's right to question a
prosecution witness regarding his criminal record." 9 The court reasoned that although the acts constituting the basis of the juvenile
record occurred subsequently to the present case, this did not affect the possibility that the witness had some ulterior motive in
testifying unjustly. ' Further, the court held that it was a violation
of a defendant's right to full confrontation, provided by the Sixth
Amendment of the United States Constitution, not to permit
cross-examination in order to establish a witness' motive for falsely
testifying.' 2 '
An understanding of the history of impeachment in Pennsylvania requires an analysis of a third aspect, which is the Pennsylvania courts' application of the state constitution. In addition to the
United States Constitution, Pennsylvania courts have also relied
113. Simmons, 555 A.2d at 863.
114. Id.
115. 560 A.2d 758 (Pa. 1989).
116. Borders, 560 A.2d at 759. The defendant was arrested for aggravated assault and
criminal conspiracy in the stabbing of the witness. Id. Subsequent to the arrest of the defendant, juvenile charges were lodged against the witness. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 760.
120. Id. The supreme court opined:
The strength or weakness derived from an attempt to show that the victim has some
ulterior motive for continuing his role as an accuser due to subsequent acts, bringing
him into the sphere of influence of the prosecutor, must rightly be determined by the
jury, which, after hearing all the evidence in the matter before them, will be most
able to ferret out the presence or absence of improper motive on the part of the
victim.
Borders, 560 A.2d at 760.
121. Borders, 560 A.2d at 760.
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on article I, section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution when ruling
on cross-examination to show bias; however, the court has not done
an independent analysis apart from this section's counterpart to
the Federal Constitution. Even though the court in Evans 2 ' based
its decision mainly on the U.S. Constitution, the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania asserted that the right to cross-examine an adverse
witness regarding pending charges was a right guaranteed by article I, section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution." 3
The' Superior Court of Pennsylvania in Commonwealth v.
Rhodes," 4 consistent with the supreme court's analysis in Evans,
based its decision on article I, section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.115 In Rhodes, the defendant, while engaging in a drug
transaction, was accused of being a police informant by a companion of the witness.' 26 The defendant shot the man and claimed it
was self defense.' 27 At trial, defense counsel was not permitted to
question the witness regarding his arrest for the delivery of a con128
trolled substance.
On appeal, the superior court considered the issue of whether
the defendant should have been permitted to reveal to the jury the
pending charges against the witness. The defendant argued that
the existence of the pending charges could have raised doubts in
the mind of the jury regarding his motive to testify. 2 9 The superior court held that the right of a defendant to confront his accuser
was inherent in the guarantees provided by the Pennsylvania Constitution, which includes the right to raise doubt in the mind of the
jury as to whether the witness was biased. 130 Thus, the superior
court opined that the defendant should have been given the opportunity to reveal the possible bias to the jury, and the refusal to
allow the defendant to cross-examine the witness violated the state
constitution.'
Accordingly, the superior court reversed the lower
122. 512 A.2d at 630. See notes 63-70 and accompanying text.
123. Id. See note 18 for the text of article I, § 9.
124. 592 A.2d 1360 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991).
125. Rhodes, 592 A.2d at 1362. See note 17 for the text of article I, § 9.
126. Rhodes, 592 A.2d at 1361.
127. Id.
128. Id. During trial and the witness' testimony, eight months had passed, yet the
witness had not faced his preliminary hearing regarding the pending charges. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. At trial it was revealed that the arresting officer had been told by the District
Attorney to "'let the case ride because the witness is involved as a Commonwealth witness
in a homicide case.'" Id. at 1362 (citations omitted).
131. Rhodes, 592 A.2d at 1362.
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court decision.1 32
There exists an inconsistency in Pennsylvania with respect to
the treatment of cases dealing with impeachment to show bias. In
Evans, 3 ' the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania clearly held that a
defendant has a constitutional right to confront a witness. The
court further noted that this confrontation right includes the right
to question a witness to reveal any interest the witness may have
in the trial as a source of bias. Additionally, the supreme court
noted that this interest included any favorable treatment the witness expects to receive. Hence, when a conflict arose between a
constitutional right and a non-constitutional right, the constitutional right prevailed.
Yet, in the recent case of Commonwealth v. Lane, the same
court determined that although the defendant was wrongly restricted from questioning an adverse witness regarding pending
charges, the error was not reversible. The court opined that the
error did not prejudice the defendant's case."" However, Justice
Nix stated in his dissent in Lane that once the defendant was denied the right of confrontation, he was automatically prejudiced in
his defense. Further, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in the
Evans decision had held that it was a question for the jury and not
the court to determine whether cross-examination for bias would
affect the jury's decision. The decision in Lane, therefore, raises
the question of whether the court in Evans' 36 intended to completely remove from the judge's discretion the determination of
whether a defendant may cross-examine a witness in an attempt to
reveal bias.
In Davis, the United States Supreme Court made clear its position that the defendant must be afforded the constitutional right
to cross-examine a witness, even if defendant's theory of impeachment was based on mere speculation.3 6 In line with the decision in
Davis, the Pennsylvania courts in Evans, Sullivan and Rhodes
held that the Pennsylvania Constitution guarantees a defendant
the right to question a witness to show possible bias. Following the
decisions in Evans and Rhodes, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Commonwealth v. Edmunds13 7 set forth a method the courts
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id. at 1362.
See notes 63-70 and accompanying text.
See notes 10-28 and accompanying text.
See notes 63-70 and accompanying text.
See notes 92-100 and accompanying text.
586 A.2d 887 (Pa. 1991). The applicability of Edmunds to the constitutionality of
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can follow when confronted with a state constitutional issue which
has a federal constitutional counterpart. 88 In doing so, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania referred to the necessity for a state
court to exercise its independence and freedom to interpret its
analogous constitutional provisions in order to provide greater protection than those contained in the Bill of Rights.139
The method that the court developed for independent analysis
consisted of four parts: (1) the court examined the text of both
provisions to determine if the wording was similar; (2) the court
examined the history of the applicable section in the Pennsylvania
Constitution; (3) the court analyzed the decisions in other states
which had examined the question as applied to their own constitutions; and (4) policy issues were addressed.1 40
Based on the procedure set forth in Edmunds, future decisions
implicating the state constitution will require the state courts to
conduct an independent analysis of the applicable state provisions
as set forth in Edmunds. Apparently, the Supreme Court of Penna defendant's right to confront an adverse witness lies not in the court's discussion of the
constitutional questions involved, but rather with the court's reference to the necessity for a
state court to exercise its independence in conducting an independent analysis of the state's
constitutional provisions. Edmunds, 586 A.2d at 896-99.
138. Id. at 895-86. In Edmunds, a police trooper obtained a warrant to inspect the
appellant's premises. Id. at 888. During the search, marijuana was seized and the appellant
was charged with criminal conspiracy. Id. The marijuana was subsequently rendered inadmissible as the affidavit failed to state the time frame within which the anonymous informants had observed the marijuana. Id. at 890. The trial court granted the prosecution's
request to provide oral supplementation to the affidavit's facts, in order to establish a "good
faith" exception to the exclusionary rule. Id. At the hearing, the judge ruled that the evidence seized, although obtained through a defective warrant, was nonetheless admissible. Id.
The trial court concluded that the officer had acted in "good faith" based on the test enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
Id. In Leon, the Court held that evidence seized pursuant to an invalid warrant issued by an
impartial magistrate, where the officer acted in good faith reliance, is permitted to be admitted as evidence. Leon, 468 U.S. at 917-18.
139. Edmunds, 586 A.2d at 894.
140. Id. at 895-905. In Edmunds, the appellant was found guilty and on appeal the
conviction was affirmed by the superior court. Edmunds, 586 A.2d at 888. The superior
court held that article I, § 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution did not provide greater protection than the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Id.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be search, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
The court held that article I, § 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides greater protection than that afforded by the analogous provision in the United States Constitution.
Edmunds, 586 A.2d at 906.
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sylvania in Lane disregarded the constitutionally protected right of
confrontation in favor of a theory of harmless error."" The holding
in Lane contradicts the principles established by the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania in Evans and the United States Supreme
Court in Davis.
If the court had applied the rule it set forth in Evans, the court
would have reversed the Lane decision based on the lower court's
error which resulted in denial of a constitutional right. Furthermore, the court in Evans held that even the mere expectancy of
leniency in pending cases must be made known to the jury. In
Lane, it was not established that a promise of leniency had been
made. Nonetheless, application of the mere expectancy rule from
Evans should have allowed Lane to reveal to the jury the charges
of kidnapping and attempted rape pending against the witness. In
fact, in Evans, the court had established that it was for the jury to
determine if any bias existed as a result of any pending charges.
What impact the decision in Lane will have on the law regarding
impeachment evidence is unclear. Undoubtedly, the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania will revisit the issue of when impeachment
evidence may be used to show bias. The Lane decision seems to
suggest that a court has substantial leeway in determining whether
to restrict the admissibility of such evidence and can make its decision on a case by case analysis. The supreme court can provide
more stringent protection to defendants than that afforded by the
United States Constitution by following the framework established
in Edmunds to conduct an independent analysis in order to establish "adequate and independent" grounds as the basis of its future
decisions regarding the confrontation clause.
The United States Supreme Court decision in Davis mandated
that the defendant has a constitutional right to cross-examine a
witness to reveal the existence of bias. As this right is of constitutional dimension, the decision in Lane must be reexamined by the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania with the Davis and Edmunds
opinions in mind.
Christine M. Guthrie

141.

See note 27.

